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Abstract: 
 
This paper examines the place of political parties and party systems in providing 
democracy for the more global world of the twenty-first century. It argues that recent 
intense globalisation has by no means rendered political parties and party systems 
irrelevant. However, political parties have lost substantial democratic impact by 
failing to move on with today’s more global times. Parties could regain considerable 
stature as democratic forces if they altered a number of practices in line with emergent 
polycentric governance of a more global world. The paper advances a number of 
suggestions that could concurrently address the general stagnancy of political parties 
and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy. 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: democracy, globalisation, political parties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for Correspondence: 
 
Professor Jan Aart Scholte 
Centre for the Study of Globalisation and Regionalisation 
University of Warwick 
Coventry 
CV4 7AL 
United Kingdom 
 
Scholte@warwick.ac.uk 
Tel: 02476572533 
Fax: 2476527548
                                                 
* This paper elaborates a presentation made at the CSGR workshop on ‘Globalising Party Democracy’, 
held at the University of Warwick in July 2005. A lightly amended version will be published in P. 
Burnell (ed.), 'Globalizing Democracy: Party Politics in Emerging Democracies'. London: Routledge, 
forthcoming. 
 3
Introduction 
 
What is the place of political parties and party systems in providing democracy for the 
more global world of the twenty-first century? If contemporary globalisation has 
shifted the contours of governance – that is, the ways that societal rules are 
formulated, applied and reviewed – do political parties need to reinvent their 
organisation and practices to fulfil their democratic role? If so, what kinds of 
adjustments are required? Or has globalisation so transformed politics that party 
formations have become obsolete in the democratic process, no longer being able to 
deliver adequate public participation in, and public control over, the decisions that 
shape collective destinies? 
 
This paper argues that the past half-century of intense globalisation has by no 
means rendered political parties and party systems irrelevant. However, political 
parties – that is, formal organisations that support candidates for elected public office 
– have lost substantial democratic impact by failing to move on with today’s more 
global times. Official circles and civil society quarters have generally made 
considerably more progress to recognise, and adjust their activities to, the shift from a 
statist towards a polycentric mode of governance that has accompanied contemporary 
globalisation. In contrast, political parties have for the most part retained a now 
obsolete statist-territorialist-nationalist modus operandi. To the extent that political 
parties currently have only limited significance for democracy in global affairs, this 
situation has mainly been of their own making. Parties could regain considerable 
stature as democratic forces if they (belatedly) altered a number of practices in line 
with emergent polycentric governance of a more global world. 
 
Along with this heavy critique of failings by political parties to date, the paper 
also advances a number of suggestions to turn the tide in more positive directions. 
Such measures could benefit party organisations and wider democracy alike. Greater 
attention to global affairs, global rules and global institutions by parties could 
contribute significantly to their revival as democratic players. In turn, more globally 
oriented political parties could provide a much-needed boost to the broader 
democratisation of globalisation. The current general stagnancy of political parties 
and the overall underdevelopment of global democracy would thereby be addressed at 
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the same time. Reinvigorated party systems are not a panacea for public participation 
and public accountability in global politics, but they could bring major advances. 
 
The paper elaborates this argument in three broad steps. The first main section 
defines key concepts (‘globalisation’, ‘governance’, ‘democracy’, and ‘political 
parties’) and summarises the consequences of globalisation for governance and 
democracy in contemporary history. The second section analyses the role in this 
altered situation of traditional political parties: ‘traditional’ here meaning territorially 
based organisations that work at the country level. Country-based political parties 
have generally failed to reorient themselves to polycentric governance, although a 
number of changes in their practices could enhance democracy in global politics. The 
third section of the paper assesses several ways that political parties can be 
reorganised beyond the state: namely, through international networks of country-
based political parties; through regional party formations; and through distinctly 
global political parties. None of these three strategies seems likely to generate major 
democratising impacts on globalisation in the short or medium term. 
 
Before proceeding to detail these points it should be stressed that this 
discussion is more a conceptual reflection than the result of systematic empirical 
research. The writer’s two decades of explorations of globalisation in a host of 
contexts across the planet may provide some grounds for informed speculations on the 
problems and prospects of political parties in a more global world. However, the 
questions and arguments set out here suggest an agenda for future research more than 
confirmed theses. As the limited bibliographical references in this paper indicate, the 
question of political parties and the democratisation of globalisation has so far 
received strikingly – indeed, deplorably – little academic attention. 
 
Concepts and context 
 
To assess the actual and potential roles of political parties in the democratisation of 
globalisation, it is of course helpful to define terms for the purpose of the analysis at 
hand, as well as to describe the general context that has prompted the research 
question. The treatment of these complex and deeply contested conceptual and 
historical issues must per force be truncated here. Readers who wish may refer 
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elsewhere to find further elaboration and substantiation of the arguments set out in 
this section (Scholte, 2005: esp. chs 2, 3, 6, 11). 
 
Globalisation and the shift to polycentric governance 
 
As the word is understood here, globalisation denotes a trend of becoming more 
global: the expansion of a planetary scale of social life. With globalisation people 
become more able – technologically, legally, linguistically, culturally, psychologically 
– to have direct connections with one another wherever on the earth they may be 
located. 
 
Although globality in this sense of transplanetary social connectivity has 
sometimes figured importantly in earlier history, global relations have undergone 
unprecedented growth since the middle of the twentieth century. Global links between 
persons now arise more frequently, take more forms, transpire faster, and impact more 
deeply than in any previous era. Indeed, contemporary history has, as never before, 
seen the emergence of transplanetary instantaneity (whereby certain global 
transmissions like intercontinental telephone calls occur in effectively no time) and 
transplanetary simultaneity (whereby certain global phenomena like satellite 
television broadcasts can involve people spread all over the world at the same time). 
 
In this way globalisation entails a significant respatialisation of social 
relations. The global, planetary sphere becomes, in its own right, an important site of 
culture, ecology, economics, law, health, history and politics. Countless phenomena 
like the Internet, air travel, intercontinental production chains, electronic finance, 
climate change, criminal networks, the United Nations system, ‘world music’, the 
AIDS pandemic, and women’s movements cannot be geographically reduced to 
territorial logics. They also have a notable ‘supraterritorial’ quality. This is by no 
means to say that other (territorial) social spaces such as households, workplaces, 
districts, countries and regions have become any less important in contemporary 
society. However, these other scales of social relations are now also supplemented by, 
and intertwined with, major global domains. It is not possible to understand the 
human condition in the twenty-first century without significant attention to global 
dimensions. 
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While altering the geography of social life, globalisation also has major 
consequences for the mode of governance. The term ‘governance’ is taken here to 
refer to the rules and regulatory institutions under which people pursue their societal 
interactions with each other. The vocabulary of ‘governance’ is here deliberately 
preferred to that of ‘government’, inasmuch as the latter word is often assumed to 
designate the formal, centralised, public, national, territorial apparatus of the modern 
state. In contrast, ‘governance’ encompasses the larger operations of regulation in 
society: nonstate as well as state; private as well as public; informal as well as formal; 
supraterritorial as well as territorial. Thus ‘governance’ is understood here in the more 
encompassing sense that others have suggested when invoking the term 
‘governmentality’, although the present analysis does not adopt a Foucauldian 
approach. 
 
Talk of ‘governance’ rather than ‘government’ is certainly appropriate with 
respect to contemporary global affairs. The regulation of transplanetary and 
supraterritorial matters generally involves multiple and diffuse sites. States retain a 
key role in the construction, implementation and evaluation of the rules that apply to 
global social relations, but the statist apparatus of societal regulation that prevailed in 
the middle of the twentieth century has given way to a more polycentric order. 
 
For one thing, substantial elements of governance have over recent decades 
become global in scale. As logic might suggest, burgeoning global activities and 
issues have prompted a notable increase of rules and regulatory institutions with a 
global span. Some of this transplanetary governance has grown through a proliferation 
and expansion of suprastate agencies with multicontinental memberships and remits. 
Well-known examples include the United Nations (UN), the Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). 
 
Yet global governance also entails more than what have traditionally been 
called ‘international organisations’. Other global-scale regulation has taken a 
transgovernmental shape, with the development of largely informal transplanetary 
networks of state officials. Transgovernmental relations have addressed matters as 
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disparate as crime, human rights, environmental regulation, and various areas of trade 
(Slaughter, 2004). Perhaps the most visible transgovernmental apparatus is the Group 
of Eight (G8) process developed since the mid-1970s. Other examples include the 
Competition Policy Network and the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
 
Still further global governance has expanded in recent times through 
nonofficial channels. This privatisation of regulation has been manifested in regimes 
such as the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB, a market-based 
organisation created in 1973), the Forestry Stewardship Council (FSC, a civil society 
body formed in 1993), and the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and 
Numbers (ICANN, a public-private hybrid established in 1998). Such developments 
demonstrate that governance of global (and for that matter any other) affairs need not 
by definition occur through the public sector (Cutler et al., 1999; Hall and Biersteker, 
2003). 
 
Concurrently with this substantial growth of global regulation, governance has 
also taken more regional form during the past half-century of intense globalisation, 
with an unprecedented expansion of rules and regulatory institutions that apply to a 
group of contiguous countries. For example, 273 regional trade arrangements had 
been registered with the WTO as of 2003 (Cosbey, 2004: 2). In certain cases inter-
regional governance relationships have emerged, as in the Asia-Europe Meetings 
(ASEM) between the European Union (EU) and the so-called ‘ASEAN+3’ 
(Association of South East Asian Nations plus China, Japan and South Korea). Many 
analysts have explained this expansion of regional regulation as both a facilitator of 
and a policy response to globalisation (Hettne et al., 1999; Hughes et al., 
forthcoming). As elaborated later in this paper, this trend in contemporary governance 
opens important possibilities for political parties to achieve democratisation of 
globalisation through regionalisation. 
 
The growth of suprastate (global and regional) governance has by no means 
rendered country-based regulation through states irrelevant in a more global world. 
Arguments widely heard in the early 1990s that ongoing globalisation would provoke 
a decline, retreat or even demise of the state have been comprehensively refuted. On 
the contrary, states – especially the more powerful states – remain central actors in 
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contemporary governance and indeed have ranked among the principal architects of 
globalisation (Weiss, 1998). In this light the second section of this paper affirms that 
political parties and party systems focused on the state retain considerable historical 
mileage in the early twenty-first century. 
 
That said, states behave differently in today’s more global world than they did 
in what could be termed the ‘territorialist’ politics of an earlier time. One major 
reorientation of state action has already been mentioned with regard to the growth and 
importance of transgovernmental networks. Another change has arisen with increased 
attention by states to global constituencies alongside domestic groups, thereby 
diluting the previous concentration of government on so-called ‘national interests’. 
For example, a state today may heed pressures from the World Bank, transnational 
companies and/or global social movements as well as – and sometimes even more 
than – demands from constituents based in its formal territorial jurisdiction. 
Moreover, under conditions of greater globality states have acquired a number of 
different policy instruments, such as computer networks and (in a few cases) 
intercontinental missiles. In addition, although earlier theses that globalisation 
necessitates a contraction of the welfare state have been largely refuted, it is clear that 
states have significantly adjusted social policies in response to the growing global 
economy. And country-level governance has paralleled global governance with 
widespread privatisation of various regulatory tasks, as manifested inter alia in the 
creation of independent central banks and the spread of nonofficial financial services 
authorities. 
 
Finally, intense globalisation of the past half-century has transpired 
concurrently with – and in various ways contributed to – significant localisation of 
governance. Across the continents states have undertaken substantial devolution to 
substate regions and districts. Several states including Brazil and Canada have also 
revised their constitutions to accord greater autonomy to indigenous peoples residing 
in the country. Concurrently, many substate governments have ‘gone global’ by 
forging direct links with global capital and global governance agencies, as well as by 
forming their own global networks like United Cities and Local Governments 
(UCLG), an association with several thousand members in over 100 countries. Hence 
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political parties can also have democratic purpose in a more global world when 
working in substate government. 
 
In sum, then, unprecedented globalisation of social life in recent history has 
been accompanied by substantial globalisation, regionalisation, reconfigured 
nationalisation, and resurgent localisation of governance. To dissect the regulation of 
a given global issue (whether it be biodiversity loss, tourism, or whatever), analysts 
must consider public, private and public-private mechanisms across global, macro-
regional, country, micro-regional and local scales. Societal regulation has lost the 
statist character that prevailed in what has frequently been described as the modern 
Westphalian system. Governance is now much more than government. 
 
The term ‘polycentrism’ well designates this situation of multiple interlocking 
nodes of regulation that are diffused across multiple scales and across public and 
private sectors. Others have described this situation with alternative terms including 
‘cosmocracy’, ‘mobius-web governance’, ‘netocracy’, ‘new medievalism’, ‘new 
multilateralism’, and ‘plurilateralism’. Whatever label is used, however, the post-
statist mode of governance requires that political parties shift their practices if they 
are to remain relevant and fulfil their democratising potentials in the twenty-first 
century. 
 
Democratic deficits in contemporary globalisation 
 
These democratic inputs from political parties are sorely needed in contemporary 
governance of global affairs. The shift from statism to polycentrism has generated 
enormous deficits of public participation in and public control of regulatory processes 
in society, particularly as they concern global issues. Shortfalls in democracy have 
produced some of the greatest public unease with contemporary globalisation, as 
witnessed most dramatically in large street protests as well as more pervasively in the 
casual conversations of everyday life. 
 
As with definitions of globalisation, this paper is not the place to undertake a 
lengthy excursion through the meanings of democracy. For present purposes 
governance is regarded as democratic when decision-taking power lies with the 
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people – a demos, a public, a ‘community of fate’ – whom the regulations in question 
affect. Of course political theorists have suggested highly diverse ways to achieve 
democracy (deliberative, participatory, representative models and more). However, 
there is general agreement that, whatever its precise form, democracy prevails when 
the members of a public determine policies: (a) collectively, together, as a group; (b) 
with equivalent opportunities of involvement for all; (c) voluntarily, without coercion; 
(d) transparently, for all to see; and (e) responsibly, including suitable accountability 
mechanisms to obtain redress for errors and omissions. 
 
The many democratic deficits in the governance of contemporary global 
affairs can be conveniently summarised under four headings. The first major problem 
is public ignorance. Effective democracy presumes competent agents. However, most 
people today have far from sufficient information and analytical tools to make sense 
of globalisation, let alone to take well-founded decisions about its governance. This 
ignorance is hardly surprising, given how poorly the various sources of public 
education have fulfilled their task in respect of global affairs. Schools, universities, 
mass media, civil society associations, governance agencies and political parties have 
all failed to give globalisation the quantity and quality of attention required to have an 
adequately informed public. With poor education, public mobilisations on 
globalisation – if they occur at all – easily have little and/or unconstructive impact. 
 
A second leading source of democratic deficits in current governance of 
globalisation lies in institutional shortcomings. That is, the processes of formulating, 
implementing, enforcing and evaluating policies that govern global matters have 
failed to incorporate adequate mechanisms of public participation and public control. 
For example, public referenda on global policy questions have rarely occurred. 
Elections to representative offices have normally left global issues on the sidelines. 
Most public suprastate governance agencies and all private regulatory bodies 
concerned with global affairs have lacked a directly elected legislature. Meanwhile 
national parliaments and local councils – as well as the political parties who field 
candidates for these offices – have rarely exercised sufficient scrutiny of government 
actions in global realms. Courts (on whatever scale, local to global) have 
systematically failed to give people adequate means of obtaining redress when 
policies concerning global relations cause harm. Likewise, governance agencies of all 
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kinds have generally provided insufficient mechanisms for civil society participation 
in and scrutiny over their activities. Moreover, civil society associations involved in 
global policy processes have themselves often failed to meet adequate democratic 
standards in their own behaviour. 
 
Alongside public ignorance and institutional failings, a third key type of 
democratic deficit in current governance of global matters relates to structural 
inequalities. It was earlier stressed that democracy requires equivalent opportunities 
for all to become involved in the policy decisions of a given polity. Yet contemporary 
global politics is everywhere steeped in social hierarchies. These deeply entrenched 
relations of dominance and subordination are manifold: by countries of the North over 
those of the South; by wealthy and professional classes over less skilled and 
unemployed workers; by modern cultures over non-rationalist life-worlds; by men 
over women; by whites over people of colour; by urban residents over rural 
inhabitants; by heterosexuals over lgbt (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender) 
orientations; by middle-aged over younger and older generations; and by able-bodied 
over disabled persons. 
 
All of these structural inequalities of opportunity have had the effect of 
arbitrarily skewing participation in global politics. Thus, undemocratically, certain 
major states have had greater weight in many global governance institutions. 
Indigenous peoples, women, subordinated races, sexual minorities and youth have 
generally found it difficult to exercise voice in the governance of global relations. 
Indeed, the policy directions that have prevailed in the (weakly democratic) regulation 
of contemporary globalisation have often sustained and sometimes even exacerbated 
arbitrary social hierarchies (Scholte, 2005: ch 10). 
 
The marginalisation of subordinated social groups often overlaps with a fourth 
major source of democratic deficits in contemporary global politics, namely, an 
insufficient recognition of supraterritorial publics. Globalisation and the broader 
respatialisation of social life of which it is a part have over the past half-century 
significantly reconfigured patterns of collective identity (Scholte, 2005: ch 7). As a 
result, the nature of the demos – that is, ‘the people’ whose participation in and 
control over governance needs to be assured – has become far more complex. In 
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territorialist times of old, ‘rule by the people’ simply meant rule by the national 
community that inhabited a given country. However, democracy in a more global 
world must address a plurality of publics, including many whose geography does not 
coincide with traditional territorial spaces. 
 
For one thing, the proliferation and growth of transplanetary diasporas in 
contemporary globalisation has brought a significant supraterritorial element to many 
national solidarities. Prominent examples of ‘global nations’ include Armenians, 
Chilean exiles, Indians, domestic servants from the Philippines, Palestinians and 
Sikhs. In addition, increased globality has involved an expansion of nonterritorial 
communities, that is, publics that have no inherent link to a particular homeland. 
Examples include global bonds among co-religionists, among people of the same 
gender or race, among those of a common class or profession, and among those of a 
similar sexual orientation. Furthermore, recent history has seen many persons 
increasingly identify themselves, at least partly, with a global humanity. This growing 
cosmopolitanism has been reflected inter alia in greater talk of a ‘world community’, 
‘human rights’, ‘global public goods’, and even ‘global citizenship’. 
 
Yet the governance of global affairs has so far generally failed to 
accommodate this growth of supraterritorial publics. Mainstream political theory and 
practice still assume that the demos takes the form of a territorial-national community. 
An incipient global civil society has given some political space to plural and hybrid 
identities, but official policy processes and political party activities on global issues 
have tended to marginalise supraterritorial collectivities. At best groups such as 
Kurds, Buddhists, women, peasants, gays and cosmopolitans have obtained some 
participation and accountability in the governance of global affairs indirectly, by 
using national-state-territorial channels. However, these supraterritorial publics have 
received little recognition in their own right, with specific positions and procedures to 
ensure their distinctive involvement in global politics. 
 
Taking in sum educational shortcomings, institutional failings, structural 
subordinations, and under-recognition of supraterritorial publics, the governance of 
contemporary globalisation has had very weak democratic groundings. Emergent 
polycentric regulation of global affairs can in no serious way be characterised as ‘rule 
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by the people’. Understandably, as noted earlier, these democratic deficits have 
prompted much disquiet. Indeed, it may be asked whether current directions of 
globalisation are politically sustainable in the absence of significant efforts to 
democratise the process. 
 
The democratisation of globalisation could be pursued through a number of 
channels. These avenues include programmes of public education; measures to 
improve transparency and accountability of regulatory bureaucracies; reform of 
judicial procedures; steps to expand and upgrade civil society activities; redistribution 
of resources in favour of structurally disadvantaged groups; and revision of 
constitutions to recognise supraterritorial publics. However, the rest of this paper 
looks more narrowly at how reoriented practices by political parties might bring 
greater democracy to global affairs. This focus on political parties does not imply that 
other approaches to upgrading democracy in global politics are less worthy. On the 
contrary, effective democratisation of globalisation probably requires concurrent 
initiatives from multiple complementary angles, including but not limited to changes 
in the organisation and activities of political parties. 
 
Political parties 
 
As indicated at the outset of this discussion, a political party is understood here to be a 
formal organisation that supports candidates (that is, politicians) for elected public 
office. Parties may be based on any of several rationales. For example, in the tradition 
of many historical party formations in Western Europe, a party may be rooted in 
ideology and a particular vision of the good society. On the other hand, parties may 
also have sectoral foundations, in cases where they pursue the political interests of a 
given social group, be it an ethnic, regional, religious, or other circle. Alternatively, a 
political party may find its glue in the charismatic personality of its leader(s). In other 
instances the raison d’être of the party may extend no further than to serve the 
professional ambitions of its career politicians. Or several of these factors may figure 
in combination. Whatever the bonds that unite their members, however, all political 
parties seek to take and retain elected public office. 
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A specific distinction is therefore maintained in the present analysis between a 
political party and a civil society association. Political parties look to occupy positions 
of public authority, while civil society bodies aim to shape societal rules without 
capturing public regulatory institutions. To be sure, grey areas may arise in the case of 
fringe political parties (such as most ultra-nationalist formations) that have little or no 
prospect of winning elections. At the same time certain civil society associations (for 
example, a number of trade unions) have maintained close affiliations with political 
parties. Thus, as ever, no definition is crystal clear. However, the broad distinction 
between political parties and civil society is sustainable. The differentiation is also 
analytically useful in an investigation of democracy, inasmuch as political parties give 
priority to strategies of indirect and representative democracy, whereas civil society 
associations tend to pursue more deliberative and directly participatory routes to 
popular sovereignty. 
 
So now to the specific concern at hand: what can political parties do to effect 
more participation and control by the demos in the construction of rules for the more 
global world of the twenty-first century? The rest of this paper considers what 
political parties might contribute: both through traditional territorial-national 
organisations; and through international, regional and global frameworks. 
 
Country-based parties in a more global world 
 
As noted briefly in the preceding survey of democratic deficits in contemporary 
globalisation, traditional territorial political parties (that is, those constructed around a 
country unit in order to pursue office in the national and local governments of that 
land) have so far failed to generate much public participation in and public control 
over the governance of global affairs. The following paragraphs identify five main 
ways that country-based political parties have fallen short in this regard and suggest 
corrective steps under each of these headings that could raise their democratic inputs 
to a more global world. The third section of this paper then goes on to argue that – 
however far country-based bodies might raise their inputs of global democracy – 
political parties must in current circumstances of polycentric governance also organise 
beyond country-state-nation units far more than they have done to date. 
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Educating publics 
 
As mentioned before, traditional territorial parties have – along with other actors in 
contemporary politics like schools, the mass media and civil society associations – 
generally failed to make publics sufficiently conscious of expanding global social 
spaces and the ways that global issues are and are not governed. Questions of global 
policy have rarely figured prominently – and often not at all – in party conferences, 
rallies and workshops. Likewise, global affairs have usually featured marginally, if at 
all, in party research and training programmes, in the selection and promotion of 
candidates, in a party’s press conferences and other public communications, and in 
campaign manifestos and debates. True, certain parties have raised public 
understanding of certain global problems, for example, in the case of Green parties 
with respect to planetary ecological challenges. For the most part, however, political 
parties have neglected their many opportunities for public education on global 
matters. 
 
Indeed, this consistent failure to address global issues has arguably contributed 
to a widespread loss of stature for traditional political parties in the public eye. 
Concurrently with accelerated globalisation in recent decades, most established liberal 
democratic states have experienced significant reductions in party memberships and 
voter turnouts. Many factors have prompted this decline, of course, but among them 
are public perceptions that established party systems have lost relevance in addressing 
the priority issues of the day. In turn, a good part of that apparent loss of relevance 
arguably lies in the neglect, especially by the large mainstream political parties, 
substantially to engage the global realities of contemporary society. 
 
This diagnosis of the problem evokes its own prescription, namely, that 
traditional territorial political parties should give greater attention to global affairs. 
Parties would thereby contribute more to public awareness of these vital issues and at 
the same time reaffirm their relevance for the twenty-first century. The fact that 
traditional political parties operate on a country-state-nation scale does not mean that 
they must restrict their policy vision to territorially bounded issues in their land of 
operation. On the contrary, parties arguably have a societal obligation proactively to 
reshape the agenda of public debate so that it catches up with the more global world 
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that has emerged over the past half-century. Indeed, for parties to perpetuate 
(inadvertently or otherwise) territorialist and statist myths is highly damaging given 
the challenges that globalisation poses inter alia for material welfare, ecological 
integrity, the rule of law, cultural identities and social cohesion. 
 
Country-based parties could take a number of specific measures to become 
more effective agents of public education on global affairs. For example, party 
meetings, publicity materials and electoral campaigns could more regularly and 
prominently discuss global policy issues such as climate change, governing the 
Internet, and global taxes to finance development. In addition, competence to handle 
global issues could be made a significant consideration when parties select their 
candidates. Political parties could also commit more resources to research and training 
that would enhance the capacities of politicians and their staffs to address questions 
related to, for instance, global migration flows, global disease control, and global 
arms trade. More globally educated candidates and party workers would in turn, 
through the wider political process, foster more globally educated (and thereby more 
democratically empowered) publics. 
 
Occupying state office 
 
As well as by educating publics, country-based political parties can fulfil a 
democratising function in today’s more global world by doing what they have always 
done: namely, gaining and holding executive power in national and local 
governments. As indicated earlier, globalisation has by no means sidelined territorial 
governments. On the contrary, states remain key actors in the regulation of global 
relations. Even district councils in small countries face decisions concerning, for 
example, contracts with global companies and implementation of global resolutions 
on the environment. Hence control of national and local governments gives political 
parties major opportunities to shape globalisation in line with the popular will. 
 
To date, however, political parties have generally underplayed these 
possibilities to democratise global affairs. For one thing, as already stressed, parties 
have mostly failed to promote public understanding of and deliberations about global 
policy issues, so that there is little well-formed popular will upon which a democratic 
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state could act. Lacking awareness of global relations and their governance, publics 
rarely press politicians holding public office to act on the problems. 
 
Nor have elected representatives in national and local government shown 
themselves particularly inclined to rise to global challenges. Indeed, politicians have 
all too often depicted globalisation as an omnipotent external force over which the 
state can exercise no control. In this vein, countless ministers have blamed various ills 
of their country on global competition, global technologies, global epidemics, and 
global institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
Yet politicians hereby underestimate their potential influence and abdicate 
their democratic responsibility. To be sure, a number of global circumstances have 
constrained the range of choices available to states. Sovereignty in the old 
Westphalian sense of a state’s claim to total authority over its realm is unavailable in 
the more global world of the twenty-first century. However, it is quite another thing to 
say that increased global connectivity has rendered governments prostrate. After all, 
states (especially stronger states) have considerable leeway in deciding whether, when 
and under what terms to accede to global regulatory regimes. Likewise, most except 
the weaker states have notable scope in determining economic, social and 
environmental policies vis-à-vis global capital. Moreover, however global the world 
may have become, states today jealously retain their near-monopoly positions in 
governing migration and military affairs, yielding only marginal roles to suprastate 
and private regulatory mechanisms. Also, globalisation has given states (especially 
the major states) various new tools and enhanced opportunities for influence with, for 
instance, electronic mass media, global currencies, and, even, satellite surveillance. 
 
Given this continued importance, the state remains a prize well worth 
contesting in a more global world. By winning national and local government office, 
traditional territorial political parties can substantially mould the formulation and 
execution of a state’s policies on global issues. If the victorious parties are genuinely 
democratic forces, then the governments that they lead can steer globalisation in 
popularly preferred directions. Again, however, to achieve this democratic purpose 
country-based political parties need to give global issues due priority and to equip 
their staffs and memberships with competence to handle global agendas. 
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Scrutinising state policies on global affairs 
 
Yet political parties do not have to occupy national and local executive office in order 
to democratise state policies on globalisation. In addition, parties in opposition – as 
well as critical voices within ruling parties – can play the role of democratic 
watchdog, scrutinising whether or not the government of the day is reflecting the 
popular will in its handling of global issues. In this way country-based political parties 
can contribute to democratic accountability in globalisation. 
 
Regrettably, few traditional political parties have done much to exploit these 
democratising possibilities. As ever, to be sure, certain exceptions exist. For instance, 
a number of national politicians and parliaments have in recent years undertaken 
closer examination of their government’s involvement in the Bretton Woods 
institutions (Halifax Initiative, 2004). However, this (modest) example stands out as a 
deviation from the norm of neglect. For instance, no country-based parties and their 
representatives in parliaments have performed systematic oversight of the important 
transgovernmental networks described earlier. Likewise, state bureaucracies have 
adopted most of their international commitments regarding global matters without 
reference to legislatures and the political parties that populate them. 
 
Clearly parties could do much more in this area. Alongside (and sometimes in 
collaboration with) civil society associations and the mass media, political parties 
could be leading agents of public scrutiny over a state’s involvement in global affairs. 
For example, party organisations and politicians could sponsor many more critical 
studies of a state’s policies on, say, global environmental matters, global human rights 
questions or global debt problems. Party representatives in legislative bodies could 
use committee hearings and plenary debates to push for improved government action 
on given global matters. Likewise, opposition parties could make the incumbent 
government’s record on governing global aspects of, say, trade or health a headline 
issue in election campaigns. 
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Engaging governance beyond the state 
 
Important though the measures just discussed may be, traditional political parties must 
not restrict their quest for public participation and public accountability in global 
governance to the state alone. Like other political actors in the twenty-first century, 
parties need to abandon outdated statist assumptions and reorient their practices to the 
emergent polycentric mode of governance. That means actively engaging the state, to 
be sure, but also other regulatory bodies. To remain effective in a more global world, 
country-based political parties must in addition attend to a host of suprastate and 
nonstate governance mechanisms. 
 
Yet in this area, too, traditional political parties have to date generally failed to 
deliver. True, as indicated in the next section, certain national parliamentarians have 
built connections with certain global regulatory agencies like the World Bank and the 
WTO, but they have generally done so on their personal initiative. However, country-
based political parties have not, as party organisations, pursued a policy of 
systematically engaging with suprastate institutions, let alone private regimes of 
global governance. A potentially important channel for conveying democratic voice to 
regulatory bodies beyond the state has therefore gone unutilised. Moreover, the lack 
of contact with suprastate and private agencies has exacerbated the parties’ ignorance 
of governance outside the state. Conversely, too, the absence of links with parties has 
contributed to often poor understanding on the part of global bureaucracies like the 
IMF about political circumstances in the various member countries. 
 
The failure of country-based political parties to engage governance institutions 
beyond the state becomes all the more striking when compared with the record of civil 
society associations in this respect. Countless business forums, community groups, 
faith-based movements, labour unions, NGOs and think tanks have developed 
substantive relationships with the various multilateral development banks, UN organs, 
the WTO, the OECD, and even a few private regulatory bodies like ICANN. In 
response to these initiatives, many suprastate governance institutions have set up civil 
society liaison bureaus, developed systematic procedures for civil society 
consultation, and issued staff guides for relations with civil society associations. 
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These official mechanisms remain inadequate in many respects, but at least they exist 
in rudimentary form. 
 
In marked contrast, global regulatory bodies have constructed nothing of the 
sort for relations with political parties. This is principally because, contrary to civil 
society organisations, parties have placed the suprastate agencies under no concerted 
pressure to engage. It seems telling that, as of 2003, IMF headquarters devoted half a 
dozen staff to civil society matters, while only one junior official had a half-time 
responsibility for parliamentary liaison across the entire world. 
 
In short, if country-based political parties are to reaffirm their promise as 
major democratic forces in a more global world, they really must catch up with the 
realities of polycentric governance. Their traditional statist orientations and practices 
are not enough for the twenty-first century and must be supplemented with systematic 
efforts to bring public voice and public accountability to the many suprastate and 
nonstate sites of regulation in contemporary governance of global affairs. 
 
Promoting global equality 
 
Yet however educated the publics and however improved the institutional processes, 
greater democracy will not prevail in the more global world of the twenty-first 
century unless the previously described structural inequalities are also addressed. If 
veritable ‘rule by the people’ is to hold sway in global politics, then all social 
categories (countries, classes, cultures, genders, races, urban/rural sectors, sexualities, 
age groups and so on) must have equivalent possibilities of involvement in the 
governance of transplanetary affairs. Partly that requires changes in institutional 
processes (like voting systems and consultation procedures) to ensure that various 
structurally subordinated circles obtain due voice in the regulation of globalisation. 
Beyond institutional changes, greater political equality also requires greater economic 
equality, which in turn necessitates a major global-scale redistribution of resources. 
 
In this aspect of the democratisation of globalisation, too, traditional territorial 
political parties have generally done little. To be sure, a host of socialist and 
communist parties have historically championed the cause of underclasses. In more 
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recent decades many parties have proactively sought to increase the involvement of 
women and racial minorities. However, despite some internationalist rhetoric, such 
initiatives by political parties have in practice focused on reducing inequalities within 
the country at hand rather than in a larger global polity. As for progressive global 
redistribution, political parties in Northern countries have (apart from a handful of 
endorsements of the proposed Tobin tax on currency transactions) rarely gone beyond 
advocacy of modest resource transfers via international development assistance. 
Meanwhile political parties in Southern countries have generally lacked the means to 
pursue concerted campaigns for more ambitious global redistribution. 
 
Once again the diagnosis of failings yields a clear corrective prescription: in 
order to advance democracy in global affairs, political parties should promote 
institutional changes and resource redistributions in the direction of greater global 
social equality. However, this remedy is easier identified than implemented. In 
particular, so long as traditional political parties maintain a territorial organisation and 
principally serve country-based constituencies, it is hard to see how global equality 
could come to rank among their priority concerns. 
 
Recognising peoples beyond the territorial nation 
 
Likewise, the territorial orientation of traditional political parties forms a structural 
impediment to progress on the fourth type of democratic deficit mentioned earlier, 
that is, the need to provide participation and accountability for a variety of publics, 
including those that do not take a territorial-national form. Traditional political parties 
assume that ‘the people’ in ‘rule by the people’ is the national community that 
inhabits the country at hand. Territorial parties cater to supraterritorial types of demos 
(such as those based on world religions, global class solidarities, or humanity as a 
whole) only secondarily, if at all. 
 
Certain exceptions to this overall neglect are found in respect of diasporas. For 
instance, a number of country-based political parties in Africa have received 
significant funding from co-nationals resident abroad. Ghana has even known an 
‘Every Ghanian Living Everywhere Party’ (EGLE) that won one parliamentary seat in 
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the 1993 elections. Many states now allow those of their citizens based outside the 
country to vote in national elections. 
  
However, traditional parties have done little to attend to supraterritorial 
publics of a non-national kind. To obtain democratic voice these ‘peoples’ have 
tended to desert political parties and turn instead to transnational social movements 
like Vía Campesina (for global peasant solidarity), the International Lesbian and Gay 
Association, and the World March of Women. Unfortunately these global civil society 
actors have developed few links with political parties, connections that could make 
parties more sensitive to plural and hybrid identities in contemporary politics. Indeed, 
the World Social Forum, a major initiative to create a global public space for a host of 
civil society movements, has in its Charter of Principles (point 9) specifically 
excluded delegates from political parties. 
 
In sum, while traditional political parties certainly do not stand in 
contradiction to democracy in global politics, they have on the whole thus far failed to 
realise their potentials as forces for bringing greater ‘rule by the people’ to 
transplanetary affairs. As indicated above, country-based parties offer, in principle, 
some of the most promising and practicable possibilities for a democratisation of 
globalisation. The main difficulty is getting established political parties and party 
systems to discard old assumptions about the nature of governance and to address the 
new realities of a more global world.   
 
Beyond Traditional Political Parties 
 
Yet no matter how far traditional political parties might pursue the democratisation of 
globalisation, their efforts can never be enough by themselves. However much 
country-based parties might change their practices, by definition they have a primarily 
territorial orientation that inhibits them from completely adequately handling global 
issues. Invariably, traditional parties mainly operate in a country sphere (to the 
relative neglect of other realms); they mainly engage the corresponding state 
apparatus (to the relative neglect of other sites of regulation); and they mainly relate 
to the corresponding national demos (to the relative neglect of other peoples). 
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In order more fully to address global spaces, governance beyond the state, and 
publics beyond the territorial nation, political parties also need to organise themselves 
on more than country-state-nation lines. The rest of this paper considers three steps 
towards such a broader orientation, namely, the development of international, regional 
and global party organisations. Overall it is concluded that these alternative party 
forms offer important possibilities for democratising global politics but limited 
immediate impacts. For the time being civil society activities beyond the country-
state-nation hold more promise for advancing global democracy than international, 
regional and global parties. 
 
International Party Networks 
 
One readily available path to develop more globally oriented political parties is to 
build international links between established country-based organisations. Such 
networks allow traditional parties to exchange views, pool expertise and coordinate 
actions with partners across the planet, including on global issues in particular. 
International collaboration among parties can furthermore have democratising effects 
if it promotes more public awareness of global affairs, more opportunities for public 
participation and accountability in global policymaking, and greater equality and 
identity recognition in global politics. 
 
Like many global activities, the origins of international party organisations can 
be traced to the late-nineteenth century. The International Working Men’s Association 
(First International) operated across Europe and North America in 1864-76. The 
Second International linked country-based socialist and labour parties in 1889-1916, 
being succeeded in the 1920s by several rival bodies. The Third or Communist 
International (Comintern) institutionalised a world movement of territorial communist 
parties in 1919-43, followed briefly by the Communist Information Bureau 
(Cominform) in 1947-56. 
 
Several international associations of country-based political parties are active 
today. Following the footsteps of the Second International and its interwar successors, 
the London-based Socialist International (SI) currently involves 148 country-based 
parties. The Fourth International, founded by Trotskyists in 1938, persists on a 
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smaller scale and without an official secretariat. The Liberal International (LI), 
established in 1947 and also maintaining headquarters in London, includes full and 
observer member organisations from 54 countries. The Oslo-based International 
Democrat Union (IDU), launched in 1983, currently groups 47 country-based parties 
with conservative and Christian Democrat orientations. The youngest international 
party association, the Global Green Network, was formally created in 2001, although 
regular intercontinental communications among country-based ecological parties 
dates from the early 1990s. 
 
The various party internationals have regularly considered matters of global 
public policy. For example, the Socialist International has supported committees, 
campaigns and working groups concerning inter alia poor country debt problems, 
migration, the Bretton Woods institutions, the Kyoto Protocol, and the WTO. The 
Fourth International has treated contemporary capitalism and workers struggles as 
distinctly global issues. The Liberal International has repeatedly addressed ‘the 
challenges of globalisation’. The Global Greens reveal a transplanetary orientation in 
their very name as well as in specific attention accorded to matters such as climate 
change and nuclear proliferation. 
 
In addition, other international networking among members of country-based 
political parties has occurred through meetings of national legislators. In this vein the 
Geneva-based Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) has operated since 1889. The London-
based Commonwealth Parliamentary Association (CPA), dating from 1911, now links 
some 170 state and substate legislatures from 53 countries. Both bodies have handled 
a number of global issues, including disarmament, financing for development, 
HIV/AIDS, and trade. In addition Parliamentarians for Global Action (PGA), an 
association involving over 1,300 representatives from 114 national legislatures, has 
worked with various UN agencies since the late 1970s. 
 
Several other international networks of country-based parliamentarians have 
focused on specific global problems. In this vein the Global Legislators Organisation 
for a Balanced Environment (GLOBE), launched in 1989, now groups representatives 
from over a hundred national parliaments. Since 2000 a Parliamentary Network on the 
World Bank (PNoWB) has involved several hundred elected representatives from 
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around 50 countries. Beginning in 2003 the IPU and the European Parliament have 
jointly convened an annual Parliamentary Conference on the WTO with legislators 
from around 80 countries. 
 
Yet the extent of this international cooperation among country-based parties 
must not be exaggerated. After decades of operations these international associations 
have made only very modest of impacts on global politics. Relatively few members, 
politicians and staff of political parties have devoted major time and energy to these 
networks. All of the party internationals have remained poorly resourced, with tiny 
staffs and budgets. Even the oldest and largest of these bodies, the Socialist 
International, currently survives on an annual budget of only £1 million. 
 
In short, a much larger scale of international networking among country-based 
parties would be required in order to advance a notable democratisation of 
globalisation through these channels. The party internationals would need to do much 
more than has occurred so far to raise public awareness of globalisation and its 
governance, to engage suprastate and private regulatory institutions, to combat global 
inequalities, and to provide platforms for supraterritorial as well as territorial publics. 
In principle the possibilities of international networking among traditional political 
parties are substantial, but in practice the results to date have been negligible. 
 
Regional Parties 
 
One step towards greater global democracy through political parties could be to move 
away from country-based organisations. After all, while international party networks 
may operate globally, their constituent elements still derive from – and work 
primarily within – a country-state-nation framework. However, political parties could 
also be organised in relation to other kinds of geographical units, including regional 
spaces in particular. Indeed, several of the party internationals also organise their 
members in regional sub-groupings. 
 
As noted earlier in this paper, regionalisation is a major contemporary trend 
alongside globalisation in contemporary history. Considerable regulation of global 
flows (in terms of communications, finance, investment, trade, etc.) has developed 
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over recent decades through regional governance apparatuses such as the EU and the 
Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR). Many advocates of regionalism have 
argued that such frameworks offer major – perhaps even the greatest – opportunities 
to harness global flows in the public interest. From this perspective regionalisation 
would be a primary strategy for the democratisation of globalisation. 
 
Thus far two regional governance projects have acquired directly elected 
parliamentary bodies. Representatives of the European Parliament of the EU (now 
numbering 732 in total) have been directly elected every five years since 1979. Voters 
in the six member countries of the Central American Common Market select 132 
representatives to the Central American Parliament, which has convened in 
Guatemala City since 1991. 
 
Not surprisingly, the emergence of directly elected regional assemblies has 
encouraged the development of regionally organised political parties to contest the 
seats. In the EU, for example, a distinctly regional European People’s Party (EPP) has 
operated since 1976, the Party of European Socialists (PES) was formed in 1992, and 
the European Free Alliance (EFA) was founded in 2004 to represent stateless nations 
across the region. Other Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) are organised 
in looser coalitions of national parties. So far the Central American Parliament has not 
acquired distinctly regional political parties, although the deputies have formed three 
main international blocs. 
 
Meanwhile a number of other regional governance frameworks have gained 
indirectly elected representative bodies with members that are appointed from the 
national legislatures of the member states. Examples include the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council of Europe (inaugurated in 1949), the Andean Parliament of 
the Andean Community (1979), the Consultative Assembly of the Arab Maghreb 
Union (1989), the Parliamentary Forum of the Southern African Development 
Community (1996), the East African Legislative Assembly of the East African 
Community (2001), the Parliament of the Economic Community of West African 
States (2002), and the Pan-African Parliament of the African Union (2004). In 
addition, a stand-alone Latin American Parliament has since 1987 linked legislatures 
of that region, but without constituting part of a larger regional governance apparatus. 
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Thus far these indirectly elected regional bodies have not called forth distinctly 
regional party organisations, although such a development might be anticipated in the 
course of further regionalisation in the future. 
 
 However, neither the existing regional political parties nor the regional 
parliaments have as yet realised significant democratising impacts on globalisation. 
At best they have occasionally brought global issues to public attention. Still more 
rarely they have scrutinised a regional body’s handling of globalisation (e.g. the 
European Commission’s policies in WTO talks). Like the secretariats of international 
party networks, the bureaus of regional political parties have had very few resources 
at their disposal. Moreover, the regional party organisations have generally 
maintained at best incidental and loose links with individual members and 
constituency branches, thereby generating little democratic participation and 
accountability for the grassroots. Indeed, the vast majority of EU citizens are unaware 
even of the existence of the EPP, PES and EFA. 
 
In sum, then, the proposition to further a democratisation of global politics 
through regional parties and party systems has an appealing underlying logic in some 
respects, but has as yet delivered little substance. Fuller realisation of this potential 
would require larger and more influential regional governance instruments, stronger 
and directly elected regional parliamentary assemblies, and well-resourced regional 
party organisations that maintained close connections with citizens. Such institutions 
would seem unlikely to develop very quickly, particularly outside Europe. 
 
Global Political Parties 
 
If effective regional political parties are at best a project for the medium term, global 
political parties as instruments for transplanetary democracy are today an even more 
remote prospect. In contrast to international party networks, which assemble country-
based organisations that strive to hold state power, distinctly global political parties 
would promote candidates for elected global governance offices. Although this idea 
has some support (cf. Patomäki and Ulvila, 2006), it hardly seems a practicable option 
for the time being. 
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To be sure, contemporary globalisation has created pressing needs for much 
more regulation with a transplanetary scope, and the major expansion of global-scale 
governance witnessed over the past half-century looks set to continue into the future. 
Demands for democratic participation in and public accountability of global 
regulatory institutions will carry on mounting, the more so if – as seems quite possible 
in the years to come – global taxes begin to generate own resources for transplanetary 
governance agencies. The stage would then be set for cries of ‘no taxation without 
representation’ at the global level. 
 
Yet thus far no global-scale regulatory agency, public or private, has shown 
any sign of including a directly elected representative arm. No UN Legislature, IMF 
Assembly, OECD Congress, or ICANN Parliament is in prospect. Hence the raison 
d’être for distinctly global political parties is – and looks to remain – decidedly 
absent. Such parties will not form if they have no seats to contest. The 
democratisation of global-scale governance mechanisms must therefore be sought 
through channels other than a transplanetary party system. 
 
In any case the construction of elected representative bodies attached to 
global-scale governance agencies raises highly problematic issues. For example, how 
would constituencies within a global arena be drawn: on country, regional and/or 
supraterritorial lines? What electoral formula would be used for global assemblies: 
one person, one vote; or some kind of weighting (and if so which one)? How would 
transplanetary ballots be conducted and monitored? What regime of campaign 
financing would apply to global political parties? 
 
Moreover, beyond these practical difficulties for global representative 
democracy through global political parties lie deeper cultural problems. One such 
systemic challenge is constructing a sufficiently strong general ethos of global 
citizenship, in which a large proportion of humanity would frame its sense of political 
rights and duties substantially in terms of a transplanetary polity and therefore find it 
meaningful to engage in global party politics. After all, country-based party systems 
did not become effective mechanisms of participation and accountability until major 
proportions of territorial populations directed significant political commitments to the 
nation-state. Regional political parties have limited prospects as engines of global 
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democratisation so long as regional populations have developed only a shallow if any 
sense of regional citizenship, as evidenced in low voter turnouts to elections of the 
European Parliament. Although global citizenship is arguably incipient and growing 
in contemporary politics, it is at this point in time even further from being a major 
force than regional citizenship. 
 
Finally, the construction of global political parties would face huge challenges 
of navigating cultural diversity. How could one devise a single coherent 
transplanetary regime of parties and elected offices that equitably accommodated the 
wide variety of political cultures across the planet? Even on the smaller scale of 
territorial states, party systems have often marginalised and excluded populations like 
many indigenous peoples for whom this modern model of democracy is culturally 
alien. Indeed, in some cases whole countries – as in many parts of Africa and Asia – 
have struggled to construct working party systems. Great care would need to be taken 
to construct global political parties that delivered veritable participation and 
accountability to all, and not just to a modernist elite. However, the necessary tools of 
intercultural communication and negotiation are not yet available for effective 
pluriversal politics of this kind. 
 
In sum, then, contemporary governance of global affairs has major needs for 
supraterritorial frameworks of democratic mobilisation, but the situation is not ripe for 
global political parties to fill this niche. For the time being global civil society 
associations hold the greater promise in this regard. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has reflected on the role of political parties in promoting democratic 
governance of global affairs. Contemporary rapid growth of transplanetary and 
supraterritorial social connectivity has significantly reshaped the contours of 
governance and created corresponding needs to recast democratic practices. Political 
parties continue to offer important democratic potential in the more global world of 
the twenty-first century, but they must adjust to the changes in order to realise this 
promise. 
 
 30
Many contributions to a democratisation of globalisation can come from 
traditional territorial political parties. Country-based parties can advance global 
democracy: by educating publics; by occupying state office; by scrutinising state 
policies; by engaging governance beyond the state; by promoting global equality; and 
by recognising peoples other than territorial nations. In short, traditional party systems 
can be relevant to public participation and public accountability in global politics if 
they suitably reorient their conceptions, priorities and practices. 
 
At the same time, as much as possible should be done to promote new types of 
party formations beyond country-state-nation units. As stressed above, the 
effectiveness of international, regional and global party organisations as agents of 
democratic globalisation will remain limited so long as they lack the resources and the 
popular bases to generate veritable public participation and public accountability on 
any significant scale. Nevertheless, international and regional party constructions in 
particular hold potentials that warrant pursuit. 
 
Yet however much might be achieved towards global democracy through 
political parties, it is clear that they can fill only part of the picture, particularly so 
long as suprastate and private regulatory bodies lack elected representative offices. 
Even then democratic global politics would require, amongst other things, a fully 
operative global human rights regime, more globally oriented public education and 
mass media, and a vibrant global civil society. Party systems are no more a panacea 
for future global politics than for past territorial politics. 
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